The asymmetry in population ethics and deontological ethics

Utilitarianism, with its aim to maximize total welfare, has a symmetry given in the following table.

Absence of pleasure is not good	Presence of pleasure is good
Presence of pain is bad	Absence of pain is not bad

We can interchange columns by exchanging ‘absence’ with ‘presence’ and ‘not’ with ‘ ’ (i.e. ‘not good’ with ‘good’ and ‘bad’ with ‘not bad’). We can also interchange rows by exchanging ‘absence’ with ‘presence’, ‘pleasure’ with ‘pain’, ‘good’ with ‘bad’ and ‘not’ with ‘ ’.

This theory can also be translated into a symmetric deontological theory, in terms of rights and duties to help and harm. We have

No right not to help others	A duty to help others
No right to harm others	A duty not to harm others

We can interchange columns by exchanging ‘no’ with ‘a’, right’ with ‘duty’, and ‘not to’ with ‘to’. We can also interchange rows by exchanging ‘not to’ with ‘to’ and ‘help’ with ‘harm’.

These utilitarian and symmetric deontological theories are demanding, as they entail that we have to sacrifice ourselves to help others. To avoid such demandingness, we can turn to an asymmetric deontological ethic, according to which we have

A right and no duty not to help others	A right and no duty to help others
No right and no duty to harm others	A right and a duty not to harm others

This theory has an asymmetry, because we can no longer interchange rows by exchanging words. (We can still interchange columns by exchanging ‘a’ with ‘no’, right’ with ‘duty’ and ‘not to’ with ‘to’.) This theory is a negative deontological ethic, as it says that negative rights (not to be harmed) are more important than positive rights (to be helped). Negative utilitarianism has a similar asymmetry. According to negative utilitarianism, pain is more relevant than pleasure. In extremis, pleasure doesn’t count: the absence or presence of pleasure is neutral (neither good nor bad).

Absence of pleasure is not good and not bad	Presence of pleasure is not bad and not good
Presence of pain is bad and not good	Absence of pain is good and not bad

This asymmetric, negative deontological ethic can be derived from a modified utilitarian theory that avoids the demandingness problem. This theory is called mild welfarism or discounted utilitarianism, and says that we have to choose the option that maximizes the sum of validly discounted utilities. Everyone has the right (but not the duty) to discount (value down, mark down) the welfare (utility) of other individuals as long as those discounted individuals cannot validly complain (object) against their welfare being discounted. Discounting a utility means subtracting an amount from the utility. A discount is valid if the discounted person cannot validly complain. The asymmetry is visible in the following table. Everyone has:

A right and no duty to discount the utilities of others if the complaint is invalid	A right and no duty not to discount the utilities of others if the complaint is invalid
No right and no duty to discount the utilities of others if the complaint is valid	A right and a duty not to discount the utilities of others if the complaint is valid

There are two ways in which a complaint against welfare discounting is invalid: when the existence of the welfare-discounting people (i.e. those who discount the welfare of others) is in a sense necessary or when the existence of the welfare-discounted people (i.e. whose welfare is being discounted) is in a sense not necessary. In other words, a complaint against discounting is invalid

1. if the situation in which the utilities of others are discounted is one where the welfare-discounting people need to exist (i.e. that situation would not be possible if those who discount the welfare of others didn’t exist) and the chosen, discounted-welfare-maximizing situation is one where the welfare-discounting people do not need to exist, or
2. if the situation in which the utilities of others are discounted is one where the welfare discounted people exist and the chosen, discounted-welfare-maximizing situation is one where the welfare-discounted people do not exist.

The first condition results in the above negative deontological ethic. A person has

A right and no duty to discount the utilities of others if one’s own existence is necessary	A right and no duty not to discount the utilities of others if one’s own existence is necessary
No right and no duty to discount the utilities of others if one’s own existence is not necessary	A right and a duty not to discount the utilities of others if one’s own existence is not necessary

 This means that a person has

A right and no duty to discount the utilities of others if that results in the person not being used as a means to the ends of others	A right and no duty not to discount the utilities of others if that results in the person not being used as a means to the ends of others
No right and no duty to discount the utilities of others if that doesn’t result in the person not being used as a means to the ends of others	A right and a duty not to discount the utilities of others if that results in the person not being used as a means to the ends of others

And this means the person has

A right and no duty not to help others	A right and no duty to help others
No right and no duty to harm others	A right and a duty not to harm others

In terms of value (goodness or badness), this entails it is

Not bad and not good not to help others	Not good and not bad to help others
Bad and not good to harm others	Good and not bad not to harm others

The above mild utilitarian principle involved a right to discount (value down, mark down) the utility of others, in a situation where one’s existence is necessary such that the situation is chosen where one’s existence is not necessary. Instead of discounting, we can also look at what happens when a person has a right to value up or to mark up the utility of others, in the situation where one’s existence is necessary such that the situation is chosen where one’s existence is necessary. That results in a positive deontological ethic, where people have:

No right and no duty not to help others	A right and a duty to help others
A right and no duty to harm others	A right and no duty not to harm others

In this positive deontological  ethic, the positive right to be helped trumps the negative right not to be harmed. To most people, this asymmetry is counter-intuitive.

When a person has both a right to value down and to value up the utilities of others, we get a symmetrical deontological ethic, where people have:

A right and no duty not to help others	A right and no duty to help others
A right and no duty to harm others	A right and no duty not to harm others

The second condition results in the procreation asymmetry in population ethics, where people have:

A right and no duty to discount the utilities of others if that results in the non-existence of those others	A right and no duty not to discount the utilities of others if that results in the non-existence of those others
No right and no duty to discount the utilities of others if that doesn’t result in the non-existence of those others	A right and a duty not to discount the utilities of others if that doesn’t result in the non-existence of those others

This entails a negative procreation asymmetry, where people have:

A right and no duty not to add a happy person	A right and no duty to add a happy person
No right and no duty to add an unhappy person	A right and a duty not to add an unhappy person

Or that it is:

Not bad and not good not to add a happy person	Not good and not bad to add a happy person
Bad and not good to add an unhappy person	Good and not bad not to add an unhappy person

The above mild utilitarian principle involved a right to discount (value down, mark down) the utility of others, in a situation where others exist such that a situation is chosen where those others do not exist. Again we can see what happens if instead of discounting we decide that people have the right to value up or mark up the utility of others, in a situation where others exist such that a situation is chosen where those others exist. In that case, people have:

No right and no duty not to add a happy person	A right and a duty to add a happy person
A right and no duty to add an unhappy person	A right and no duty not to add an unhappy person

This is a positive procreation asymmetry, which seems counter-intuitive to most people. When a person has both a right to value down and to value up the utilities of others, we get a symmetrical population ethic, where people have:

A right and no duty not to add a happy person	A right and no duty to add a happy person
A right and no duty to add an unhappy person	A right and no duty not to add an unhappy person

In summary, the asymmetry of mild welfarism (discounted utilitarianism) underlies the asymmetries in population ethics (the procreation asymmetry: adding an unhappy life is bad, adding a happy life is neutral) and deontological ethics (negative rights trump positive rights), and has the same asymmetry structure as negative utilitarianism.